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DEVELOPMENTS
Japanese Corporations and
American Civil Rights Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent case, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano,1 the
United Staies Supreme Court held that a subsidiary of a Japanese corpo-
ration that incorporated in the United States is, by the literal language of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Treaty or Japanese
Treaty), an American corporation.2 Therefore, the American company
could not use the Japanese Treaty as a shield against American civil
rights laws. This case directly resolved issues posed by the Second Cir-
cuit,' and provided guidance in an almost identical Fifth Circuit case,
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America).4
Plaintiffs in both cases argued that the U.S. subsidiaries are U.S. cor-
porations, and must comply with U.S. law proscribing racial discrimina-
tion in employment. Defendants countered that the Japanese Treaty
shielded them from U.S. law. The district courts in both cases held that
American subsidiaries were not foreign corporations, and thus, they could
not invoke articles of the Japanese Treaty to avoid U.S. discrimination
laws.
These holdings raised the difficult issue of corporate nationality. Of
what nationality is a corporation that is incorporated in the United
States, yet owned by Japanese citizens? The Fifth and Second Circuits
both reversed the district courts' holdings on corporate nationality, and
held that American subsidiaries were, in essence, foreign corporations,
and could invoke provisions of the Japanese Treaty.
However, the basic issue of whether a foreign corporation could dis-
criminate in violation of U.S. laws was not resolved. The Second Circuit
held that the Treaty does not exempt a Japanese company operating in
the United States from discrimination laws, while the Fifth Circuit held
that the Treaty shielded a foreign company from these laws. Thus, this
issue was ripe for determination by the United States Supreme Court.
1. 102 S.Ct. 2373 (1982).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Treaty or Japanese Treaty].
3. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) aff'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
4. 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979); 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), 102 S.Ct. 2951 (1982).
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Deciding that a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corporation is a U.S. corpo-
ration, the Supreme Court avoided the more difficult question of whether
or not a Japanese corporation operating in the United States can discrim-
inate in violation of U.S. laws.
This article will focus initially on the analysis each court made to
reach its respective holding. Next, the relevant discrimination laws will be
reviewed. Finally, the Japanese Treaty, general rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, and the issue of corporate nationality will be discussed.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE CASES
Plaintiffs in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),5 who were non-Japa-
nese employees of the defendant, brought suit alleging racially-based em-
ployment discrimination.' To support their motion to dismiss, defendants
stressed that the Treaty provided them with the absolute right to hire
executive personnel "of their choice."'7 Also, defendants argued that the
"treaty trader" test of corporate nationality was applicable.' The district
court acknowledged that the right to hire personnel "of their choice"
might be available to a foreign corporation, but denied this right to Itoh-
America. Applying the rationale of United States v. R.P. Oldham,9 the
court held that Itoh-America is an American corporation both by the
terms of the Treaty, and under settled law determining corporate nation-
ality.1" Further, the court found that the "treaty trader" argument was
not worthy of consideration," and noted that section two of the Treaty
Protocol would be rendered meaningless if defendants' arguments were
adopted.1 2
Itoh-America also asserted that it could raise the rights of its parent
corporation. However, the facts of the case law argued were distinguisha-
ble from the facts of this case,1 3 and the court denied the motion to dis-
5. 469 F. Supp. 1.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 23.
8. The "treaty trader" test uses ownership of stock as the basis for determining corpo-
rate nationality. For a discussion of the "treaty trader" test, see notes 94-97 infra, and ac-
companying text.
9. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). The court in Oldham stated that place of incorpo-
ration determined corporate nationality. For a discussion on corporate nationality and the
Oldham decision, see notes 80-100 infra, and accompanying text.
10. 469 F. Supp. at 5.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 7. Section 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty provides, in relevant part, "[t]he
provisions of Article VI, paragraph 3, providing for the payment of compensation shall ex-
tend to interests held directly or indirectly by nationals and companies of either Party in
property which is taken within the territories of the other Party." This section provides
protection against state appropriation. If these foreign corporations were already protected,
the addition of section 2 of the Protocol would have been redundant. 469 F. Supp. at 7.
13. The cases relied upon were Association of Data Processing Services Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.
1976).
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miss. However, recognizing the novelty of the issue, the court granted an
immediate appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."'
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Treaty history and stressed that trea-
ties "[u]nlike domestic legislation . . must create a common ground be-
tween differing cultures . . . .'" After reviewing many secondary
sources,"6 the court concluded that these sources supported the proposi-
tion that all foreign corporations can invoke provisions of the Treaty.
Otherwise, there would be "an unreasonable distinction between treat-
ment of American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations on the one hand,
and branches of Japanese corporations on the other.' 7
The Fifth Circuit also held that the article VIII(a) "of their choice"
provision gave Japanese corporations the absolute right to hire and pro-
mote as they choose, irrespective of American civil rights laws.'9 The
court recognized that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
might be consistent with the Treaty if applied."9 However, reasoning that
Title VII was passed subsequent to the Treaty, and did not expressly
overrule the Treaty, the court found Title VII inapplicable.2 0
In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, plaintiffs, past and present
female secretaries of the defendant, claimed that defendant discriminated
on the bases of sex and national origin, in violation of Title VII, and of 42
U.S.C. section 1981.21 Defendants denied that they discriminated, argued
that the Treaty shielded them from these claims, and also interposed four
counterclaims that arose out of the filing of the suit.22
Calnetics involved antitrust violations brought against Volkswagen of America, Inc.
(VW), a U.S. incorporated subsidiary of a West German corporation, and Volkswagen Prod-
ucts Corporations (VPC), VW's wholly-owned American incorporated air conditioning sub-
sidiary. The trial court had enjoined VW and VPC from importing automobiles equipped
with air conditioning. VW, VPC and the Federal Republic of Germany urged that the re-
striction "offends Article 16 of the German/American Treaty of 1954, and Articles I and III
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, because it restricts German manufacturers
but not American automobile manufacturers, who remain free to sell cars with factory in-
stalled air conditioning." Id. at 693. The Ninth Circuit recognized the discriminatory effect
the ban imposed and seriously questioned the prudence of granting equitable relief. Calnet-
ics stands for the proposition that an American subsidiary has standing to raise the claim
that its parent's treaty rights may be affected by court ordered relief. However, the instant
cases are easily distinguishable in that the parent company will not be affected by a court
order to hire host country nationals. The parents do not participate in the hiring and firing
decisions of the American corporations.
14. 469 F. Supp. at 910.
15. 643 F.2d at 356.
16. Id. at 356-58. For a discussion of the secondary sources, see notes 92-100 infra, and
accompanying text.
17. Id. at 358.
18. Id. at 360-63.
19. Under Title VII, bona fide occupational qualification requirements might exempt a
Japanese corporation from complying with the antidiscrimination mandate.
20. 643 F.2d at 362.
21. 473 F. Supp. at 508.
22. Id. at 508-09.
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The district court reviewed the secondary sources, but ultimately
held that the reasoning of Oldham was applicable.2 s The court allowed
the Title VII claims to stand, but dismissed the section 1981 claims.24
The Second Circuit analyzed the case in a fashion similar to that of
the Fifth Circuit. After discussing the history of the Treaty and the pur-
pose of the relevant articles, the court held that the Treaty granted rights
to American subisdiaries; otherwise, "a crazyquilt pattern would
emerge. ' '2 5 However, the Second and Fifth Circuits differed in interpret-
ing the article VIII(1) phrase "of their choice." The Second Circuit con-
strued the phrase in the light in-which it was drafted. Its purpose was "to
facilitate a party's employment of its own nationals to the extent neces-
sary to insure its operational success in the host country .... ,,28 The
court concluded that a Title VII claim could stand on the facts of this
case.
In summary, the Fifth and Second Circuits reached opposite deci-
sions concerning the applicability of American civil rights laws on foreign
subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. The Fifth Circuit exalted
the Treaty while the Second Circuit exalted American civil rights laws.
The Supreme Court initially reviewed rules of treaty interpretation.
Relying on Maximov v. United States,27 the Court held that the treaty
language controls unless allowing it to control would be inconsistent with
the intent of the treaty drafters. 2 Next, the Court focused specifically on
Treaty articles VIII(1) and XXII(3). Article VIII(1) provided that compa-
nies of either party shall be permitted to engage managerial personnel "of
their choice." Article XXII(3), the definitional article, provided that
"companies" means any entity, whether or not established for pecuniary
profit. Furthermore, article XXII(3) provided "[clompanies constituted
under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical
status recognized within the territories of the other Party. 2 9 (Emphasis
added).
As Sumitomo was constituted under the laws and regulations of the
State of New York, the Court held that it was a company of the United
23. Id. at 511-13. The court held that the terms of the Treaty and established rules of
law provide that the corporation is American.
24. Id. at 514. Section 1981 does not cover claims based upon sex and national origin
discrimination. See notes 37-43 infra and accompanying text.
25. 638 F.2d at 556.
26. Id. at 559.
27. 373 U.S. 49 (1963). Maximov was a case involving the interpretation of article 14 of
the income tax convention between the United States and the United Kingdom. Plaintiffs,
who were beneficiaries of a trust, asserted that they need not pay tax on capital gains be-
cause they were subjects and residents of the United Kingdom, and exempted by convention
provisions. The Supreme Court stated that the Second Circuit's interpretation "is the one
more consonant with its [the Convention's] language, purpose and intent. Id. at 51.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 2377.
29. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. 3.
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States. 0 Therefore, Sumitomo could not invoke rights provided by article
VIII(l).
In support of its holding, the Court noted that this interpretation is
consistent with other Treaty provisions."' Also, the Governments of Ja-
pan and the United States agreed with this interpretation."2 The Court
simply disagreed with Sumitomo's argument that "the intent of Japan
and the United States was to cover subsidiaries regardless of their place
of incorporation," and with the Second Circuit's assertion that a "crazy-
quilt" pattern would emerge.88
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Plaintiffs in these cases brought suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.34 Title VIP is probably the most
comprehensive federal scheme directed against employment discrimina-
tion."6 It provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to
hire, or otherwise discriminate against an individual because of the indi-
vidual's race,87 color, religion, sex or national origin. In these cases, the
Japanese employers allegedly discriminated against females, and Ameri-
cans. Thus, to fall within the purview of Title VII, either the term
"American" must be characterized as describing a national origin, or the
evidence must show sex discrimination. 8
30. 102 S. Ct. at 2378.
31. Id. at 2378 n.8.
32. Id. at 4645. Considering the image problems that Japan has had in the United
States since the Japanese have captured the automobile and other markets, the Japanese
Government's position is not too surprising.
33. Id. at 2380-82.
34. In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution was also brought and apparently dropped. 653 F.2d at 553
n.1. Other laws that deal with employment discrimination include: Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); The
National Labor Relations Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 141; and the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621; J. PEMBERTON, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-
RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES 172 (1975). For a list of Federal enactments pertaining
to employment discrimination, see id. at 345-51.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 as amended (1972).
36. J. PEMBERTON, supra note 34, at 9.
37. Race discrimination under Title VII requires proof that a plaintiff:
(i) belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali-
fications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Because Americans are not a
racial minority, it is doubtful whether a claim based on race could stand.
38. A claim of sex discrimination under Title VII will require a showing of inequality in
pay, working conditions, or opportunity for advancement. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, Inc. 642 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); and East v. Romine Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.
1975), for cases dealing with sex discrimination under Title VII.
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National origin discrimination was the focus of the Supreme Court's
decision in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Company. 9 Plaintiff in Es-
pinoza, a Mexican citizen, was denied employment at the defendant com-
pany because of the company's policy against hiring aliens. Plaintiff as-
serted that this treatment was discrimination based on national origin.
The Court stated that the "term 'national origin' on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came."'4 0 Applying this literal definition, the
Court determined that although Title VII protects against discrimination
on the basis of nationality, it does not apply where a company merely
discriminates on the basis of citizenship.4 '
In these cases, it is questionable whether national origin discrimina-
tion is present. The Japanese employers could take the position that they
have a company policy against promoting non-Japanese citizens to execu-
tive or managerial positions.'" Furthermore, the Japanese corporation can
assert that it has been deemed an American corporation, and is merely
being selective in hiring its employees. Even if the plaintiffs can later
prove discrimination, the Japanese corporations will have several defenses
available.'
Section 19811" is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.45 The Act
of 1866, an implement to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, was aimed at ensuring that the recently freed slaves
had the same political and economic rights as other citizens. Thus section
1981 was originally held to grant protection only in actions between white
and non-white citizens.' Yet, rights under this section have been ex-
panded. Protection has been granted to "all persons [who have a claim]
against state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of
39. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
40. Id. at 89.
41. If the court had decided that the discrimination was based on national origin, the
claim would have been sustained. In Roach v. Dreiser Ind. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F.
Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980), the court allowed plaintiff's claim to stand, even though the
discrimination was against an individual of Acadian ancestry, and Acadia was never a
country.
42. This position is arguably supported by Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
43. For a discussion of the defenses available, see Note, Commercial Treaties and the
American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947
(1979).
44. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
45. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 4, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
46. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
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alienage or color. ' '47 Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that section 1981
proscribes discrimination on the grounds of citizenship by private em-
ployers. 48 However, claims under this section are limited, and discrimina-
tion claims based upon sex4 9 and national origin"' have been denied.
The U.S. discrimination laws will play an important role in these
cases. A possible conclusion that may be reached is that American subsid-
iaries of Japanese corporations can legally discriminate.
IV. THE TREATY
In April of 1953, the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. The Treaty was one of over one
hundred commercial treaties concluded by the United States prior to
1958.1' For Japan, the Treaty had special significance. For obvious politi-
cal and economic reasons, many nations, including the United States, ter-
minated relations with Japan during World War HI.5" The 1953 Treaty
represented Japan's initial step toward economic recovery; it was Japan's
first postwar commercial treaty.5
The purpose of the Treaty was not political.54 Similar to all Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, the purpose was "to provide a
legal framework within which economic relations between the two coun-
tries [could] be developed to their mutual advantage. ' 55
The Treaty is composed of twenty-five articles and the Protocol."
47. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948).
48. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. Apodaca v. Gen. Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M. 1978); Williams v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
50. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
51. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Modern Treaties). Previously, Walker said that the
United States had concluded approximately 130 commercial treaties, the first treaty being
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of February 6, 1778, with France. Walker, Provisions on
Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J, INT'L L. 373, 374 (1956).
52. During the hearings, it was noted that "[pirewar commercial relations between the
United States and Japan rested upon a commercial treaty concluded in 1911." Commercial
Treaties-Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy,
Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany and Japan: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
1953 Hearings].
53. Id. at 27.
54. Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 806.
55. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 27.
56. Walker stated that:
[tlhe Protocol, by serving inter alia, as a convenient vehicle in attending
to special variations or preoccupations of individual countries, reduces the
amount of deviation between treaties, with respect to general outline, basic
content and array of principles. It also serves as a bulletin board for posting
certain tenets of construction which are considered desirable to record formally
but which may lead to mischievous inferences of being substantive additions
rather than precautionary explanations, if they are integrated into the rule to
1982
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These provisions grant personal rights to nationals of the other party, and
provide the framework within which business may be conducted. The
personal rights granted include "such fundamentals as freedom of travel
and residence, freedom of worship, freedom of communication, the right
to decent and humane treatment if in police custody, access to courts of
justice and security for property rights."5" Concerning business activities,
the Treaty provides, inter alia, that nationals of the other party shall con-
duct business upon as favorable terms as nationals of the host country."'
The Treaty also provides that the owner of a business has the right to
manage his own affairs, that a business in competition with a state con-
trolled enterprise shall receive fair treatment, and that the state will pro-
vide just compensation for nationalized property and allow reasonable op-
portunity to repatriate earnings and capital."
Treaty articles I, VII(1) and XXII(3), the provisions at issue in the
instant cases, merit further discussion. Article I(1) provides that nationals
shall be able to enter and remain in the territories of the other Party for
the purpose of "carrying on trade. . . and engaging in related. . . activi-
ties." " Further, nationals are permitted to develop and direct "opera-
tions of an enterprise in which they have invested .... "' Article 1(2) is
a miniature bill of rights, and permits Parties within territories of the
other Party to enjoy liberty of conscience, to hold religious services, to
gather and transmit material and to communicate with persons inside
and outside such territories.6 2
which they relate.
Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 808 n.9.
57. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 2.
58. This treatment, where a national of the other Party is accorded treatment equal to
nationals of the country, is known as "national treatment." Treaty, supra note 2, at art.
XXII(1). Contrast national treatment with "most favored nation treatment," where nation-
als of the other Party are accorded treatment no less favorable than other non-nationals in
the nation. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII(2).
59. 1953 Hearings, supra note 52, at 2-3. The normal content of a Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation Treaty includes the elements found in the following synoptical
outline:
Preamble, general purposes; Entry, movement and residence of individu-
als; Liberty of conscience and communication; Protection of persons from mo-
lestation and police malpractices; Protection of acquired property; Standing in
the courts; Right to establish and operate businesses; Formation and manage-
ment of corporations; Nonprofit activities; Acquisition and tenure of property;
Tax treatment; Administration and exchange controls; Rules on international
trade and customs administration; Rules governing the state in business;
Treatment of ships and shipping; Transit of goods and persons; Reservations,
definitions and general provisions; Settlement of disputes; Procedural clauses;
Protocol, an appendix of varying length, containing material construing and
clarifying the treaty text, and making accomodations to take account of indi-
vidual situations.
Modern Treaties, supra note 51, at 808.
60. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1, para. (1)(a).
61. Id. art. I, para. (1)(b).
62. Id. art. I, para. (2).
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Article VII(1) provides the framework for economic relations between
the two countries. In relevant part, article VII(1) provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, indus-
trial, financial and other business activities within the territories of
the other Party . . . . Accordingly, such nationals and companies
shall be permitted within such territories: (a) to establish and main-
tain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establishments ap-
propriate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize companies
under the general company laws of such other Party; and (c) to con-
trol and manage enterprises which they have established or
acquired.3
The right of citizens of one country to form local subsidiaries under the
corporate laws of the other country, granted by this article, is a post
World War II achievement. 4
Article VIII(l), the major focus of dispute in these cases, provides in
relevant part that "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be per-
mitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants
and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and
other specialists of their choice." (Emphasis added). Read in light of arti-
cles I and VII(1), article VIII(1) appears to give foreign subsidiaries
choice over management personnel. Unfortunately, article XXII(3)
clouded the issue. Article XXII(3) provides "the term 'companies' means
corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations. . . . Com-
panies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the
territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall
have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other
Party."" Article XXII(3) appears to say that a company incorporated in
the United States is an American corporation. Thus, read together, these
articles are amenable to two conflicting interpretations. As argued in
these cases, articles I, VII(1) and VIII(1) appear to provide, even to an
American subsidiary, the right to employ management and other special-
ists "of their choice." However, the Supreme Court, adopting the plain-
tiffs' position, found article XXII(3) controlling. Article XXII(3) says
63. Id. art. VII, para. (1).
64. During the Hearings before the Subcommittee, it was noted that:
[tihe legal reason inhibiting a more extensive provision for corporations in
earlier treaties (namely, the reserved rights of the states as to the admission of
foreign corporations) has been solved in the current treaties by a formula
which equates the alien corporation to other out of state corporations, rather
than to the domestic corporation, for the purposes of national treatment in the
United States.
Commercial Treaties-Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the
United States and Columbia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1952).
65. Treaty, supra, note 2, at art. VIII, para. (1).
66. Id. art. XXII, para. (3).
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that an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation is an American cor-
poration. Therefore, the American corporation must abide by all domestic
laws, including discrimination laws.
V. TREATY INTERPRETATION
In 1953, the year the Treaty was executed, the world was recovering
from the effects of World War II, and civil rights, as we know them today,
were not a major concern of the Treaty drafters. The purpose of article
VIII(l)17 was simply to permit foreigners to own and operate a company
within the territory of the other country. Although the Treaty drafters
were protecting foreigners from discrimination by the host country,68 it is
questionable whether article VIII(1) was aimed at eliminating reverse dis-
crimination. Practically speaking, it is probable that the Treaty drafters
never envisioned foreigners discriminating against nationals of the host
country. This consideration makes interpretation of the Treaty difficult,
and limits the weight that can be given to the Treaty drafters' intent.
The Supreme Court, however, looked at intent, and relying on Max-
imov v. United States said that "[t]he clear import of treaty language
controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expecta-
tion of its signatories."19 One expectation of the Treaty drafters was that
place of incorporation should determine corporate nationality.7 0 The Su-
preme Court complied with this expectation and carrying it to an ex-
treme, implying that the Treaty drafters intended that a Japanese owned
American corporation is American for all purposes, including compliance
with American civil rights laws. This interpretation avoided the issue of
the conflict between treaty and subsequent law.
In Asakura v. City of Seattle, 1 the Supreme Court said "[t]reaties
are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two construc-
tions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it
67. Id. art. VIII, para. 1.
68. Describing rights of entry and the change in treaties from the 1920's and 1930's to
postwar treaties, Walker said:
Though equal provision for subordinate investor-enterprise employees is
not yet possible owing to lack of statutory authority, such personnel is to an
extent provided for, in that management is assured freedom of choice in the
engaging of essential executive and technical employees in general, regardless
of their nationality, without legal interference from 'percentile' restrictions and
the like ....
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present
United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 234 (1956). The problem that Article VIII(l)
resolved was discrimination by the host country against foreigners, not reverse
discrimination.
69. 102 S.Ct. at 2377.
70. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. 3.
71. 265 U.S. 332 (1923). Asakura, a citizen of Japan, brought suit against the City of
Seattle when the City passed an ordinance prohibiting non-U.S. citizens from engaging in
the pawnbroker business. The ordinance was held to violate the treaty.
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and the other favorable to them, the latter is preferred."'" The rationale
for this rule is twofold. First, domestic courts should not make foreign
policy. Second, treaty beneficiaries must be granted all possible rights
under a treaty.78 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,7 4 the Supreme
Court described the relationship between treaties and subsequent federal
laws.7 5 In Fong, officers of the United States arrested and detained three
Chinese subjects. Under authority of the Act of 1892, 76 the United States
planned to deport petitioners. Petitioners claimed that deportation would
be in violation of the July 28, 1868 treaty between the United States and
China.7 The Court said:
In our jurisprudence, it is well settled that the provisions of an
act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority,
on this, as on any other subject, if clear and explicit, must be upheld
by the courts, even in contravention of express stipulations in an ear-
lier treaty. . . . [Treaties are] of no greater legal obligation than the
act of Congress. By the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof
and treaties made under the authority of the United States are both
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount author-
ity is given to one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a
contract between nations, and is often merely promissory in its char-
acter, requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Such
legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the treaty
operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of
Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a
legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress.
In either case, the last expression of the sovereign will must control."'
Fong permits Congress to overrule prior law, in the form of treaty or
statute.
7 9
In these cases, the applicable laws were promulgated subsequent to
the execution of the Treaty. However, Congress was not explicit, and if
the Treaty and the laws conflict, it can only be implied that the laws
control.
VI. CORPORATE NATIONALITY
The Supreme Court noted that application of a control test could
72. Id. at 342.
73. Applying this rule, the Japanese would be allowed to discriminate. However,
Asakura is distinguishable from the instant cases. Asakura involved a city ordinance, while
these cases involved federal law.
74. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
75. Id.
76. Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons Into the United States, ch. 60, 27
Stat. 25 (1892).
77. Treaty with China, July 28, 1868, United States-China, 16 Stat. 739; T.S. No. 48.
78. 149 U.S. at 720-21.
79. The Court upheld the validity of the subsequent Act and deportation of petitioners.
149 U.S. at 735.
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certainly make nationality a subject of dispute. 0 The control test is ong
approach taken to'determine the nationality of a corporation. Professoi
Vagts identified various criteria used to determine corporate nationality
These include: "[tihe jurisdiction of incorporation, the principal place o
doing business, the nationality of the voting control, the nationality of th(
dominant investors, the nationality of management, [and] the nationalit3
of 'control'. . . .,8 These criteria are often found in combination. Majol
criteria combinations have been recognized and the following doctrine.
identified: 1) the center of administration; 2) the center of exploitation
and 3) the place of incorporation s' doctrines. Under the center of admin-
istration doctrine, nationality is determined "at the place where the com-
mercial business is carried on, and in the case of a noncommercial legal
person, the place where its functions are discharged." ' This doctrine put,
the world on actual notice of nationality. The center of exploitation doc-
trine uses "the main place where the legal person executes its purpose" tc
determine nationality." This doctrine has been criticized because a com-
pany often exploits resources in more than one location, and more signifi-
cantly, many of management's activities take place far from where the
exploitation takes place, and are excluded from the nationality decision.
According to the place of incorporation doctrine, "the personal law of a
legal person is the law under which that person has been incorporated. '"81
Although place of incorporation is the doctrine most often applied, 8" it is
not without shortcomings. This doctrine allows for "forum shopping,"
and companies can avoid harsh laws by incorporation in a favorable for-
eign jurisdiction. 87
Applying any one of these doctrines to the instant cases results in a
finding that the Japanese subsidiaries are of American nationality. The
corporations' commercial businesses are carried on in the United States
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2379-80 n.11.
81. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints of For-
eign Enterprise, 74 HAnv. L. Rv. 1489, 1490 (1961).
82. M. WouF, PRIVATE INRNATIONAL LAw 297 (2d ed. 1950). Wolff noted that this
doctrine is also known as the "seige social" and "prevails in France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Austria, Switzerland, Poland and most other continental countries." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 298. This doctrine has been applied in France and is accepted by many of
France's eminent scholars.
85. Id. at 299.
86. REsTATMsEon (SBcolD) oF FOREIGN RaLAi.ONs LAw OF THE UNTED STATES, § 27
(1965) has adopted the place of incorporation as the natibnality of a corporation.
87. See also G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF TE LAw OF CORPORAxONS AND OTHER BusiNEss
Ermu'msas § 90 (2d. ed. 1970). Henn has recognized two basic principal tests for determin-
ing corporate nationality. The aggregate test looks "to the nationality, domicile, or residence
of the individuals who control the corporation." The aggregate test is similar to Wolff's
center of administration doctrine. The second test, the entity test, looks "to the nation
where it was incorporated, where its shareholders or board of directors meetings are held, or
where it has its principal place of business. This test combines Wolff's place of incorporation
doctrine, and at least part of the center of exploitation doctrine. See note 82 supra and
accompanying text.
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in satisfaction of the "center of administration" doctrine. The business
purposes are executed in the United States, in satisfaction of the "center
of exploitation" doctrine. Finally, the corporations were incorporated in
the United States, in accordance with the "place of incorporation"
doctrine.
In determining corporate nationality, the district courts in hoth of
the instant cases recognized and applied 8 United States v. R.P. Old-
ham.89 Defendants in Oldham were indicted for conspiring in restraint of
trade in violation of the Sherman Act and Wilson Tariff Act. In particu-
lar, defendants, who were in the business of importing and selling wire
nails on the West Coast of the United States, were charged with re-
straining interstate and foreign commerce in Japanese wire nails. One is-
sue discussed by the court was the effect of the Treaty. One of the co-
conspirators, Kinoshita & Co., a Japanese subsidiary incorporated in the
United States, asserted that Treaty article XVIII provided the exclusive
remedy. Article XVIII provides in relevant part, "[a]ccordingly, each
Party agrees upon the request of the other Party to consult with respect
to any such [antitrust] practices and to take such measures as it deems
appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects."'90 The Old-
ham court found fault with this argument for three reasons. First, article
XVIII did not provide an exclusive remedy, because it was permissive
rather than mandatory. 1 Second, the court found the article XXII(3) def-
inition of companies controlling." Finally, the court concluded that na-
tionality is determined by place of incorporation and said:
Thus by the terms of the Treaty itself, as well as by established prin-
ciples of law, a corporation organized under the laws of a given juris-
diction is a creature of that jurisdiction, with no greater rights, privi-
leges or immunities than any other corporation of that jurisdiction.93
Secondary sources, such as negotiating history, unilateral statements
made by a party, subsequent practices of the parties, and change of cir-
cumstances, are often used in treaty interpretation." They played an im-
88. 469 F. Supp. at 4; 473 F. Supp. at 510.
89. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
90. Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XVIII, para. 1.
91. 152 F. Supp. at 823.
92. Article XXII(3) provides that "[c]ompanies constituted under the applicable laws
and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof
." Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XXII, para. (3).
93. 152 F. Supp. at 823. Thus, the court recognized that place of incorporation is rele-
vant in determining corporate nationality, and went on to say:
If co-conspirator Kinoshita & Co., Ltd., Tokyo had wished to retain its
status as a Japanese corporation while doing business in this country, it could
easily have operated through a branch. Having chosen instead to gain privi-
leges accorded American corporations by operating through an American sub-
sidiary, it has for the most part surrendered its Japanese identity with respect
to the activities of this subsidiary.
94. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1967).
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portant role in these cases, providing valuable background information.
Although the Supreme Court did not address the issue, in the courts
below defendants argued that the "treaty trader" test of corporate na-
tionality should be applied. This argument makes use of article I, para-
graph 1 of the Treaty and guidelines promulgated by the Department of
State. Article 1, paragraph 1 provides that the so-called "treaty trader"
can enter the United States for the purpose of carrying on trade.9 5 De-
partment of State regulations require, inter alia, that a "treaty trader" be
employed "by an individual employer having the nationality of the treaty
country.. . or by an organization which is principally owned by a person
or persons having the nationality of the treaty country. . . ."0 Further,
Department of State Guidelines provide that "the nationality of the em-
ploying firm is determined by those persons who own more than 50% of
the stock of the employing corporation regardless of the place of incorpo-
ration." Under the "treaty trader" doctrine, place of incorporation be-
comes irrelevant, while the nationality of the shareholders gains
importance.
Application of the "treaty trader" doctrine in this case presents two
problems. First, the Department of State's regulations deal with general
immigration rules, while the Treaty deals with commerce between two
nations. The immigration rules were not necessarily written with the in-
stant issues in mind. Second, and of greater importance, is that the
Treaty itself appears to contradict the Department of State's regulations.
Article XXII(3) says a corporation is a national of the place in which it
incorporated.
Other secondary sources offered to interpret the Treaty influenced
the Court's decision regarding corporate nationality. Relying on Kolorat
v. Oregon,9s the Court stated that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the mean-
ing attributed to Treaty provisions by the government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." 99 In
1982, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed that a sub-
sidiary of a Japanese company that incorporated in the United States is
not protected by the Treaty.100 The 1982 communications clarified the
"The Supreme Court itself has said: Of course treaties are construed more liberally than
private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words
to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties." Id. at 387.
95. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying text.
96. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1981).
97. 9 FORMGN A". MANuAL, part II.
98. 366 U.S. 187 (1961). Kolorat involved an alien's right to take both real and personal
property by intestate succession. The Supreme Court relied in part on the interpretation
given to the treaty provision by an agency of the government.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2379.
100. Dep't of State Cable No. 026490, from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary
of State, dated Feb. 21, 1982; and Diplomatic Communication from the Embassy of Japan
in Washington to the U.S. Dep't of State, Apr. 21, 1982; relevant part reprinted in 102 S.
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confusing communications discussed at the trial court and court of ap-
peals levels, and also simplified the Court's task. Both parties to the
Treaty agreed to an interpretation consistent with American society's
view concerning civil rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avigliano, the Supreme Court
held that a Japanese owned company that incorporated in the United
States, must comply with U.S. civil rights laws. The company had argued
that article VIII(1) of the Japanese Treaty permitted it to hire executive
and managerial personnel "of their choice," without complying with U.S.
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court however, went to a different sec-
tion of the Treaty and found a seemingly simple answer to the dispute.
Article XXII(3) provided that a company created in the United States is
a company of the United States. Therefore, U.S. discrimination laws
could be applied. The Supreme Court relied in part on the views of the
Governments of Japan and the United States. Both Governments stated
that where a company incorporates within the jurisdiction of the other
country, the company becomes a citizen of the other country. Thus, the
Court's decision did not upset the political community.
However, the Court did take an extremely narrow stance and avoided
many difficult issues. This case did not resolve the issue of whether a
purely Japanese corporation, operating in the United States, can bla-
tantly discriminate in violation of U.S. laws. The Japanese Treaty was
not written to license each country's companies to discriminate. Rather,
the Treaty was written to assist foreign companies to establish themselves
in the other country's business community. Reverse discrimination was
not addressed by the Treaty, nor was it in the minds of the Treaty draft-
ers when the Treaty was written. The Court could have taken a bolder
stance against discrimination, and held that even article VIII(1) does not
permit unfettered discrimination.
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